After responding to this line of inquiry, which was not posed to any of the white veniremembers, the prospective juror was peremptorily challenged by the State. 3 Concerned that the prosecutor's strike was racially motivated, defense counsel raised an objection under Batson v. Kentucky. 4 After determining that the defendant had established a prima facie case of discrimination, 5 the trial judge afforded the prosecutor an opportunity to proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the peremptory challenge. In his defense the prosecutor offered two justifications. First, that the stricken veniremember "had an attitude that where she thought that basically, the system is unfair to minorities, and the defendant's being black is -and her being black would over compensate by basically letting this guy off. "6 Second, that she "thinks the whole jury process is [a] fraud. "7 Notwithstanding the defendant's claim that these explanations were pretextual, the trial judge concluded that there "was an articulable basis for the prosecutor's challenge in this case. " 8 Thus, the case proceeded to trial, and the defendant was eventually convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.9 On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, however, the trial judge's ruling was reversed on the ground that the prosecutor's explanation for the challenged strike was unworthy of credence because it was unsupported by the voir dire transcript. 10 The facts of State v. McRae are representative of a large number of Batson cases in which the validity of a prosecutor's explanation for a peremptory challenge is the main point of inquiry both during the trial and on appeal. 11 This emphasis is largely a function of the fact that, under Batson, proof of pretext is the legal equivalent of proof of intentional discrimination. 12 In other wor,ds, if a defendant 10. In particular, the state supreme court noted that "the record of the prosecutor's examination of the juror in question fails to support the explanation given by the prosecutor for striking the juror." 494 N.W.2d at 257. Accordingly, " [t] o allow the striking of this juror ... in effect would allow a prosecutor to strike any fair-minded, reasonable black person from the jury panel who expressed any doubt th [ at] 'the system' is perfect." 494 N.W.2d at 257.
The justices' words reflect a keen awareness of one of the Supreme Court's underlying concerns in Batson, namely that the purposeful exclusion of African-Americans from jury service undermines "public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). The irony, however, is that race-based strikes, like the one exercised in this case, contribute to the perception among blacks that the justice system is unfair.
Batson also proscribed race-based prosecutorial challenges "on the assumption -or ...
intuitive judgment -that they [blacks] would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race." 476 U.S. at 97. Notwithstanding this unequivocal language, the trial court in
McRae accepted, as legitimate, the prosecutor's contention that because the defendant and excluded juror were both black, the veniremember "would over compensate by basically let- challenging a peremptory strike can convince a trial judge during the final stage of the Batson hearing that the explanation offered by a prosecutor in support of a peremptory strike is pretextual,13 then she will prevail as a matter of law.14 In the process of determining whether a peremptory strike is valid, lower courts rely on the TI.tie VII burden-shifting framework originally laid out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 15 As a result, the order and presentation of proof in Batson cases deliberately parallels the order and presentation of proof in TI.tie VII intentional discrimination suits. down when applied in cases alleging the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
I. BATSON.' ITS PURPOSE AND APPLICATION
This Part examines the Court's landmark ruling in Batson and describes how lower courts have applied it. Section I.A argues that Batson was a reaction to Swain v. Alabama, and was intended to ease the burden of proof on criminal defendants challenging the States' use of peremptories. Section I.B explores the operation of Batson's three-part proof structure. Section I.C argues that establishing pretext is presently the critical question in Batson cases.
A. An Interpretation of Batson To understand Batson it is important to recognize that Batson was a direct response to an earlier, much maligned, peremptory challenge case: Swain v. Alabama.11 The decision in Batson was a clear rejection of the notion embraced by the Court in Swain that it was reasonable to assume that a prosecutor's strikes were based on legitimate considerations. Section I.A.l argues that Batson eased Swain's excessive burden of proof and reversed Swain's presumption regarding the discriminatory potential of peremptory challenges. Section I.A.2 contends that in addition to relieving Swain's excessive burden of proof, Batson sought to alleviate two other harms caused by discriminatory peremptories: harm to the excluded juror, and harm to the integrity of the justice system. [Vol. 94:488 recognized that, in principle, proof of the systematic exclusion of blacks through the State's use of peremptory challenges was sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution.20 Nevertheless, in practice, the burden of proof required to prevail under Swain was nearly insurmountable. In order to show a constitutional violation, a defendant had to demonstrate that the prosecutor challenged blacks "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be." 21 As a result, Swain did little, on a case-by-case basis, to deter prosecutors from challenging veniremembers solely on the basis of race.22
Batson as a Reaction to
By the mid-1980s, faced with compelling evidence of the continued use of racially motivated peremptory challenges, 2 3 the Supreme Court decided to reconsider its primary holding in Swain. In Bat-20. Although the· Court embraced the principle that " 'fi]urymen should be selected as individuals, ·on the basis of individual qualifications, and not as members of a race,' "380 U.S. at 204 (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950)), it appeared reluctant to lessen the evidentiary burden placed on defendants challenging peremptory strikes.
If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a criminal case, the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome. Such proof might support a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is being used to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population. 380 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added).
21. 380 U.S. at 223. One of the most disturbing aspects of the Court's ruling in Swain was that although "there never ha(d] been a Negro on a petit jury in either a civil or criminal case in Talladega County," the majority nonetheless ruled against Swain on the grounds that he lacked sufficient evidence to establish that discrimination occurred at his trial. 380 U.S. 223-24. In fact, Justice Goldberg noted in his dissent that "[s]ince it is undisputed that no Negro has ever served on a jury in the history of the county, and a great number of cases have involved Negroes, the only logical conclusion ... is that in a good many cases Negroes have been excluded by the state prosecutor." 380 U.S. at 235 (Goldberg, J., dissenting 27 The trial judge, however, rejected Batson's argument noting that the parties could "strike 'anybody they want to.' " 28 The Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari and ruled that race-based peremptory challenges were unconstitutional and that, in order to prevail, a criminal defendant need not prove that the individual prosecutor had a history of exercising discriminatory strikes.29
The Court in Batson clearly rejected the notion underlying These practices led Justice White to comment that "the practice of peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries in cases with black defendants remains widespread, so much so that I agree that an opportunity to inquire should be afforded when this occurs." 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
24. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). tor's strikes were based on legitimate considerations.30 In fact, Batson explicitly recognized that peremptory challenges allow "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate"31 and that Swain's "crippling burden of proof" essentially had immunized such challenges from constitutional review.3 2 Batson recognized that the burden in Swain had been insurmountable and established a new three-stage analysis, based on TItie VII, which was clearly aimed at malting objections to discriminatory peremptory challenges more viable. 33 Furthermore, the Court stated that in meeting Batson's lower burden of proof, the objecting party could rely on the fact that the peremptories offer the opportunity to discriminate. 34 The Batson Court's decision to lessen the standard of proof required to show a constitutional violation makes it substantially easier for a defendant to prevent a prosecutor from exercising racially motivated peremptory challenges.
Batson's Three Harms
Although Batson primarily focused on the constitutional harm suffered by the criminal defendant as a result of race-based peremptory challenges, 35 the Court also identified two additional harms, arising from discriminatory peremptory challenges: the harm to the excluded juror, and the harm to the integrity of the justice system as a whole. can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.'" (quoting Avery, 345 U.S. at 562)).
35. See 476 U.S. at 86 (holding that "[p]urposeful racial discrimination in the selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure").
36. See 476 U.S. at 87-88; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel., 114 S. a. 1419, 1427 (1994) (reasoning that "[t]he community is harmed by the State's participation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders").
37. 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that Batson applies regardless of whether the criminal defendant and excluded juror are of the same race).
38. 500 U.S. 614 {1991) (ruling that Batson applies in the context of civil as well as criminal trials).
McCollum,39 andJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 4 0-the Court specifically focused upon the impact of these two harms. Essentially, what emerges from these four subsequent cases is the fundamental principle that the legitimacy of our system of justice is severely undermined by the continued existence of racial discrimination in the jury selection process. More specifically, the Court reasoned that:
Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of justice is fundamental to our democratic system. It not only furthers the goals of the jury system. It reaffirms the promise of equality under the law -that all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to take part directly in our democracy .... When persons are excluded from participation in our democratic processes solely because of race or gender, this promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial system is jeopardized. Second, that it is inherently difficult to prove intentional discrimination without reference to circumstantial evidence.4s As a result, the Court noted that in weighing whether a defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, courts should make a careful and searching inquiry into any evidence that may be relevant to establishing discriminatory intent. 46 To facilitate this inquiry, the Court borrowed the Title VII proof structure .. This section examines the workings of this burden-shifting scheme. It explores first how the scheme operates in its original Title VII context and then how it works under Batson. If the plaintiff is successful at this first stage, the burden of production shifts to the employer at the second stage to come forward with a "legitimate non-discriminatory reason" for its adverse employment action.so For example, at this second stage an employer might contend that the plaintiff was fired because of poor performance evaluations or frequent tardiness. It does not matter, for purposes of stage two analysis, if the proffered reason is credible, or if it was the real reason for the employer's action. All that matters is that the reason asserted be facially nondiscriminatory.
The Roots of
Once the employer offers a facially valid justification, stage three of the McDonnell Douglas framework affords the plaintiff an opportunity to demonstrate that the reason proffered is pretextual and that race was the real reason for the adverse employment action.51 During this final "pretext" stage of proof, plaintiffs can pre-48. The term prima facie case in the Title VII context "denote[s] the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption," rather than "the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981). According to the Court:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume this largely because we know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 {1978) (citation omitted).
49. In particular, the plaintiff must prove the following four elements: (1) he "belongs to a racial minority"; {2) "he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants"; (3) "despite his qualifications, he was rejected"; and (4) "after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
50. In Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248, {1981), the Supreme Court clarified the exact nature of this second-stage burden. Specifically at issue in Burdine was whether the employer's second-stage burden is one of production or persuasion. In other words, the Court was asked to decide whether the McDonnell Douglas standard required that a Title VII defendant persuade the court that it was "actually motivated" by the reason(s) proffered; or, whether it was sufficient for an employer simply to introduce evidence that "raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." 450 U.S. at 254-55.
The distinction between these two production requirements is significant. Under the former, an employer would be required not only to come forward with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action but also to convince the factfinder by a preponderance of the evidence that it actually was motivated by the proffered reason. By contrast, under the latter production requirement, an employer would satisfy its burden simply by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, regardless of whether it proved to be the the defendant is unable to articulate a "legitimate nondiscriminatory" reason for the adverse employment action, namely one that on its face does not violate Title VII. In such circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in her favor because the de-
than not motivated the employer, or indirectly, by proving that the employer's explanation lacks credibility.5 2 For instance, under the first option, a plaintiff might offer evidence establishing that his employer had a history of using racial epithets to refer to him and other black employees. By contrast, under the second option a plaintiff could establish that his firing was racially motivated because white employees with equally poor or worse performance evaluations or similar tardiness problems did not lose their jobs.
How
[T]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove veniremembers of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' Fmally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremembers from the petit jury on account of their race.53 fendant has failed to rebut the presumption of discrimination previously established by the prima facie case. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2748.
52. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Marina C. Stzteinbok provides a helpful explanation of these two avenues of proof. She notes the following:
[U]nder McDonnell Douglas, both the type of evidence the plaintiff introduces and the method of proof itself are indirect. The distinction Burdine established between "direct" and "indirect" modes of proving pretext must be understood in this context. The plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence whether pretext is proved directly or indirectly. By invoking the "more likely" strand of Burdine, the plaintiff proves discrimination affirmatively (i.e. "directly") through the introduction of circumstantial evidence. By invoking the "unworthy of credence" strand, however, the plaintiff proves discrimination "indirectly," without needing to build an affirmative case that the defendant more likely than not discriminated. 
In reversing the Eighth Circuit, which had ruled in favor of the defendant, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred "by ... requiring that the justification tendered at the second step be not just neutral but also at least minimally persuasive." 58 Essentially, therefore, Elem represents the Burdine of the Batson line of cases, insofar as it stands for the proposition that at the second stage of proof the challenged party bears a burden of production, not persuasion. s9 Notwithstanding Elem, a prosecutor will not succeed in rebutting the prima facie case at the second Batson stage merely by asserting that he sensed that a black juror would be partial to the defendant because they were both black. 60 Batson cautioned that prosecutors may not overcome the inference of discrimination simply by stating that their strike was in good faith and not motivated 54. Among the considerations the Court mentioned as relevant to the determination whether a prima facie case has been established were "a 'pattern' of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire" and the "prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges." 476 U.S. at 97.
The Court also noted that, in weighing the evidence in support of a prima facie case, "the trial court must undertake a 'factual inquiry' that 'takes into account all possible explanatory factors' in the particular case." 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630 (1972)).
55. 476 U.S. at 97. Although the state is required to come forward with some nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the "explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." 476 U.S. at 97.
115 s. Ct. 1769 (1995).
57. In Elem, the prosecutor had justified his strike on the ground that the veniremember "had long curly hair. He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He appeared to not be a good juror for that fact, the fact that he had long hair hanging down shoulder length, curly, unkempt hair." 115 S. Ct. at 1770.
In reaction to the majority's ruling, the dissenters noted that: The Court's unnecessary tolerance of silly, fantastic, and implausible explanations, together with its assumption that there is a difference of constitutional magnitude between a statement that "I had a hunch about this juror based on his appearance," and "I challenged this juror because he had a mustache," demeans the importance of the values vindicated by our decision in Batson. 115 by a discriminatory animus. 61 Instead, the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral explanation that is relevant to the case at hand.6 2 Ultimately, if a trial or reviewing court determines at the third stage that the reasons asserted by the prosecutor at stage two are insufficient to overcome the inference of discrimination, the criminal defendant is entitled to the appropriate relief. 63 For example, a prosecutor might claim that her peremptory challenge was based on her belief that a black veniremember's prior criminal record would make him a bad juror for the State's case. Although this explanation is legitimate on its face, and therefore satisfies the State's second-stage burden under Elem, a defendant could still prevail at the third stage if he could establish that the prosecutor's explanation was pretextual. In other words, if the defendant could prove that the black veniremember who was struck did not actually have a criminal record, or that white veniremembers with similar records had not been struck, then the defendant would be entitled to relief under Batson.
In many cases, the presence of one or more of the following five factors will support a defendant's conclusion that the prosecutor's explanation is pretextual:
1. The reason given for the peremptory challenge is not related to the facts of the case; 2. There was a lack of questioning to the challenged juror or a lack of meaningful questions; 3. Disparate treatmentpersons with the same or similar characteristics as the challenged juror were not struck; 4. Disparate examination of members of the venire, i.e., questioning a challenged juror so as to evoke a certain response without asking the same question of other panel members; and 5. An explanation based on a group bias where the group trait is not shown to apply to the challenged juror specifically. 64 Consequently, under the Batson proof structure, if the defendant is successful in proving pretext by establishing one of these factors, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. focus of inquiry in such cases has shifted away from the prima facie case toward an assessment of the adequacy of the prosecutor's proffered reasons for the challenged strike. 65
C. Pretext Evidence in the Batson
One explanation for this high degree of scrutiny at the pretext stage is the standard of proof that is required to prevail under Batson. Because proof of pretext under Batson is the legal equivalent to proof of intentional discrimination, many state and federal judges, in order to expedite Batson hearings, ask prosecutors to offer a race-neutral explanation for their challenges even before a prima facie case is established. 66 The enormous significance that trial judges place on pretext evidence means that an increasing number of Batson motions are decided solely on the basis of whether the trial judge is convinced that the. prosecutor's proffered reasons are pretextual.67
In light of the wide range of explanations considered raceneutral under Batson, 6 8 however, prosecutors readily can succeed in exercising discriminatory peremptory challenges. 69 For example, a prosecutor legitimately can justify a strike based on the fact that the excluded juror has a relative who has been prosecuted for a crime, 70 lives in the same county as the defendant, 71 wears dark glasses, 72 wears a hat, 7 3 or is young or unmarried, 74 all of which make it extremely difficult for defendants to prevail on Batson motions at trial. Moreover, due to the factual nature of a trial judge's ruling 65 regarding whether a proffered reason is pretextual, reviewing courts are required to grant enormous deference to these findings.1s Although the exact standard varies from state to state, generally a reviewing court cannot reverse a ruling below unless, after assessing the entire voir dire transcript, it " 'is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. ' "76 Notwithstanding this extremely deferential standard of review, 20% of state 77 and 10% of federal7 8 Batson cases in which the legitimacy of the prosecutor's explanation was an issue on appeal, were reversed on the ground that the trial judge committed clear error in accepting -as nondiscriminatory -the proffered explanation for the peremptory challenge. 7 9 In other words, in all of these cases, the reviewing court was convinced after assessing the voir dire transcript that the prosecutor's reasons for the strike were pretextual, which under Batson is the legal equivalent to proof of intentional discrimination. Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference." (citation omitted)).
II.
In particular, the Supreme Court has held that a trial court's factual findings -of which a finding of pretext is one -may not be reversed on appeal even if the reviewing court is "convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985 on the question whether proof of pretext in a Title VII disparate treatment case was equivalent, as a matter of law, to proof of intentional discrimination. 8 .1 In general, the appellate courts that addressed the issue adopted one of two distinct standards. Some circuits embraced a "pretext-only" approach, 82 treating proof of pretext by the plaintiff as the legal equivalent to proof of intentional discrimination. In practice, this approach is the functional equivalent to the current standard of proof in Batson cases. Other circuits, however, advocated a pretext-plus approachS3 that only en- s a matter of both common sense and federal law, an employer's submission of a discredited explanation for firing a member of a protected class is itself evidence which may persuade the finder of fact that such unlawful discrimination actually occurred"); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 {3d Cir.) {holding that "[i]f the plaintiff [shows] that it is more likely than not that the employer did not act for its proffered reason, then the employer's decision remains unexplained and the inferences from the evidence produced by the plaintiff may be sufficient to prove the ultimate fact of discriminatory intent"), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 647 (arguing that the plaintiff "is not required to prove that the [defendant] was motivated by bad reasons; he need only persuade the factfinder that the [defendant's] purported good reasons were untrue"); see also Lanctot, supra note 81, at 71-81 (discussing in greater depth the arguments in favor of a "pretext-only" approach).
83. See, e.g., Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that "[i]f the presumption is rebutted, the burden of production returns to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual and that the employment decision was based on a sexually-discriminatory criterion"); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 981 n.3 {11th Cir. 1989) (finding that "merely establishing pretext, without more, is insufficient to support a finding of racial discrimination"); Keyes v. Secretary of Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988) {ruling that "it was plaintiff's burden not only to show that the defendant's proffered reasons for hiring someone else were apocryphal, but that those reasons were pretexts aimed at masking sex or race discrimination"); Benzies, 810 F.2d at 148 {ruling that plaintiffs have "the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the reasons advanced ••. are a pretext and that the substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's decision was discrimination and but for that discrimination, the plaintiff would have been appointed"); see also Lanctot, supra note 81, at 81-91 {addressing the arguments in favor of a "pretext-plus" standard).
[Vol. 94:488 abled the factfinder to draw a permissible, rather than mandatory, inference of discrimination from a finding of pretext. In practice, pretext-plus courts often required the plaintiff not only to prove that the employer's reason was pretextual, but also to offer additional evidence that discrimination was the real motivation behind the adverse employment action. 84 In contrast, pretext-only courts presumed that discrimination was the real reason as soon as the plaintiff proved that the employer's explanation was unworthy of credence. In Hicks, the Supreme Court resolved this conflict in favor of the pretext-plus courts, holding that proof of pretext alone does not mandate a finding of intentional discrimination. This Part analyzes the Court's decision in Hicks with particular attention paid to its reasons for rejecting the principle that proof of pretext under the McDonnell Douglas framework is legally equivalent to proof of intentional discrimination. This Part concludes that the Court was concerned that a "pretext-only" standard subjected employers to an unreasonable risk of unwarranted liability.
Prior to an administrative shake-up at St. Mary's Honor Center, Melvin Hicks, a black shift commander, consistently received satisfactory job performance evaluations. Following a series of supervisory changes, however, he was subjected to "repeated, and increasingly severe, disciplinary actions" which ultimately resulted in his dismissal from the job.ss In response to his termination, Hicks filed a race discrimination suit against St. Mary's. At the trial, the court concluded that the justifications St. Mary's offered for firing Hicks -the severity and accumulation of rules violations -were merely pretextual because similarly situated white coworkers were not subjected to comparable disciplinary actions.s6 Notwithstanding this evidence of disparate treatment, the trial judge ruled in favor of St. Mary's on the ground that Hicks had not proven that the crusade to terminate him "was racially rather than personally motivated." 87 88. Relying on existing precedent, Hicks argued on appeal that because he had successfully discredited St. Mary's proffered explanations for his tennination, he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In agreeing with Hicks, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that because "all of defendants' proffered reasons were discredited, defendants were in a position of having offered no legitimate reason for their actions." Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 {8th Cir. 1992),
The specific question presented to the Court -in Hicks89 was whether the trier of fact in a Title VII disparate treatment case was compelled to find for the plaintiff if it disbelieved the employer's proffered reasons for taking an adverse employment action.9o A sharply divided Court ruled that proof of pretext within the McDonnell-Douglas framework did not, as a matter of law, mandate a judgment for the plaintiff.9 1 Rather, according to the majority, discrediting the defendant's proffered reasons for its action only permits the trier of fact to draw a permissible inference that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.92
The Court's ruling in Hicks established the principle that an employer's unpersuasive or contrived justifications for an adverse employment action are not the equivalent to proof of intentional discrimination.93 Implicit in the Court's holding was the view, previously expressed by various lower courts, that a wide variety of reasons might exist for terminating an employee, none of which rise to the level of violating Title VII. 94 For example, an employer might feel compelled to offer an explanation that it knows to be false rather than admit in pleadings or open court that its actions were actually the result of personal favoritism, dislike, politics, an arbitrary decision, or clerical or administrative mistakes. 95 Moreover, it is often the case that the defendant is a company that is forced to rely on the testimony and recollection of various employees regarding their state of mind or the actions and motivations of other employees,96 all of which makes it extremely difficult specifically to identify the "real" motivation for the adverse employment action. Referring to this problem, the Hicks Court noted:
[T]he employer's 'proffered explanation,' his 'stated reasons,' his 'articulated reasons,' [do not] somehow exist apart from the record -in some pleading, or perhaps in some formal, nontestimonial statement made on behalf of the defendant to the factfinder. ("Your honor, revd., 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). Consequently, they "were in no better position than if they had remained silent, offering no rebuttal to an established inference that they had unlawfully discriminated .
• Relying on this reasoning, the Court concluded that a proof standard that regards pretext evidence as the legal equivalent to proof of intentional discrimination risks unnecessarily subjecting faultless employers to liability under Title VII.9s
III. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST APPLYING HICKS TO BATSON
Part III addresses the question of whether the Hicks standard of proof should be applied in the Batson context. Section III.A argues that because of the practical differences between Title VII and Batson cases, the reasoning in Hicks is inapplicable when applied to cases alleging the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Section ill.B argues that the principles that motivated the Court's ruling in Batson also would be undermined if its current proof structure were altered along the lines suggested by Hicks.
A. An Argument Against Applying Hicks to Batson
As argued in Part II, two primary concerns motivated the Court's decision in Hicks. First, in light of the wide variety of reasons for why an employer might fire an employee -many of which may be considered illegitimate but nevertheless do not rise to the level of violating Title VII -proving pretext should not carry enormous evidentiary weight. 99 In other words, even though an employer may have offered an "incredible" reason for an adverse employment action, it is too great a leap of logic to assume that therefore the real motivation was racial animus.100 Second, because proof of pretext is not necessarily affirmative proof of an intent to discriminate, it is wrong to hold employers liable under Title VII simply based on such a showing, because to do so would unfairly result in liability for employers that may have acted arbitrarily but not in violation of Title vrr.101
The problem with applying the logic of Hicks to Batson cases simply because they both operate under the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting proof structure is that Title VII and Batson cases are contextually distinct. First, unlike a Title VII disparate treatment case, Batson objections do not require factfinders to analyze employment relationships, which by their nature often include individual personal relationships that could factor -positively or negatively -into employment decisions. Prosecutorial peremptory strikes are rarely based on a personal relationship with the juror,102 virtually eliminating personal animosity as a factor.
Furthermore, the scope of evidence available on which to determine intentional discrimination differs greatly from the employment context to Batson. 103 The issues raised in Batson hearings do not require the parties to conduct depositions and interrogatories, read lengthy evidentiary records or hear from a multitude of witnesses. Rather, they only require the prosecutor to offer an explanation for his or her own strikes based on the transcribed voir dire testimony of potential jurors, which itself has been taken in the presence of all of the relevant parties. Equally important, however, is the fact that in Batson cases the individuals that are called upon to proffer an explanation for their actions are actually those responsible for exercising the peremptory challenge. Thus, Batson stands in stark contrast to Title VII cases where employers are often required to rely on the testimony of individuals who were not actually responsible for the adverse employment action. 1 04 In other words, there is no concern in Batson, as there is in the Title VII context, of a prosecutor being bound by the statements or actions of others. In Hicks, the majority emphasized the fact that Title VII employers are not required to stand before the court and claim " [y] lead, and even blatantly to lie, to a trial judge regarding their reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge. As the Supreme Court has noted, however,
It is difficult to imagine that ... intentional violations of defendants' constitutional rights by Government prosecutors who are officers of the court charged with upholding the law would not have a considerable detrimental effect on the integrity of the process and call for judicial action designed to restore order and integrity to the process.106
With this principle in mind, it is difficult to imagine -in light of the long history of prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge -that altering the Batson proof structure along the lines suggested by Hicks would have anything but a "detrimental effect on the integrity of the process" of selecting juries.
B. The Implications of Applying Hicks to Batson
Part I of this Note focused on the Batson Court's purpose in lowering the standard of proof required for a criminal defendant to establish that the State has exercised a racially motivated peremptory challenge. It noted that the Court's ruling was influenced, at least in part, by a concern over the widespread use of race-based peremptory challenges, a practice that the Court clearly intended Batson to counteract. 107 The Court's decision to apply the McDonnell Douglas proof structure in Batson cases, therefore, can and should be understood as a means of facilitating this goa1.1os But altering the Batson framework in accordance with Hicks would, like Swain, have the practical effect of placing a higher burden of proof on criminal defendants, thus making it more difficult to prove that the State has exercised a racially motivated peremptory challenge.
Furthermore, application of Hicks to the peremptory challenge framework appears to conflict with Batson's premise that the peremptory challenge is "a practice 'providing the opportunity for discrimination.' "109 Unlike in the employment discrimination context, where any number of legitimate reasons might explain an employer's pretextual justification for dismissing an employee, Batson recognizes that pretextual justifications for peremptory strikes almost certainly reveal discriminatory animus.no
If Hicks were applied to Batson, it would essentially reintroduce a Swain-like presumption to peremptory challenge cases. 111 By requiring more than a showing of pretext in the Title VII context, Hicks creates a presumption, akin to that in Swain, that employment decisions, even those that are justified by pretextual reasons, are presumptively nondiscriminatory unless intentional discrimination is affirmatively proven. The Batson presumption is the exact opposite: the peremptory "permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' "112 Application of Hicks to the peremptory challenge setting, for example, would create uncertainty about the proper outcome in a case like State v. Reliford 113 where the government's explanation for a strike proved to be pretextual. In Reliford, a state prosecutor claimed that he removed a black juror because the juror knew the defendant from church. The Missouri Court of Appeals found that this explanation was pretextual because the prosecutor had not struck a white juror who knew the defendant from work. 114 Under the current Batson standard, Reliford is entitled to a new trial because it is presumed that the prosecutor's pretextual justification for the peremptory challenge concealed a discriminatory intent. But if Batson were altered along the lines suggested by Hicks, the outcome in cases like Reliford, where the reason given is facially neutral but pretextual, would be less than certain. What more would the defendant need to show?
For a more extreme illustration, consider United States v. Guevera.11s In Guevera, a federal prosecutor claimed that he used a peremptory challenge to excuse a black woman from the jury panel because she was an unemployed, single mother. 116 On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on the ground that the prosecutor's reason was pretextual because the struck juror was "married, childless, and employed at the same casino as other [white] jurors who were not challenged." 117 Under a Hicks framework, the trial judge or reviewing court could have found that the prosecutor's explanation was wholly unsupported by the record, yet still rule in favor of the prosecutor on the ground that the defendant had only proven pretext and not racial discrimination. (Vol. 94:488 In practice, therefore, a prosecutor could offer a patently false justification for a strike and then argue, notwithstanding the lack of a credible explanation for his actions, that the defendant is not entitled to judgment because he has failed to offer sufficient evidence to support a finding that the strike was race-based. Such a standard clearly has the potential to enable prosecutors to mask racial discrimination in the jury selection process by relying on a tool -a peremptory challenge -that is by its nature susceptible to misuse. 118 Finally, it is important to note that in the vast majority of cases, the most that the defense can prove is pretext. Hicks calls for a direct showing of intentional discrimination,119 which would be impossible in the Batson context because aside from pretext there is little evidence available to the defendant. Barring a prosecutor's use of a racial slur during voir-dire, or some similarly improbable misstep, it is hard to imagine what evidence of discrimination could exist aside from proof of pretext.
CONCLUSION
Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny are a powerful statement by the Court regarding .the importance of eradicating racial discrimination from the jury selection process. In overruling Swain, a twentyone year old unanimous precedent, 12 0 the Batson Court decried Swain's "crippling burden of proof' 121 and adopted a new standard of proof specifically aimed at easing the burden on criminal defendants.
Although Batson itself has not succeeded fully, in practice it has proven far more effective than Swain in the struggle to combat the use of discriminatory peremptory challenges. 122 As a result, it is particularly important that the decision in Hicks not be extended to the Batson context. Applying Hicks to Batson, in effect, would reestablish a Swain-like presumption in cases alleging the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Prosecutors' peremptory strikes would once again become "largely immune from constitu-118. See supra notes 109, 112 and accompanying text. Although some may take offense to the implication that prosecutors would intentionally exercise racially motivated peremp· tory challenges, one need only look to the plethora of cases in recent years in which race has been an underlying or explicit element in the case to realize the influence that a consideration such as race must play in the selection of juries. tinal scrutiny." 1 23 As a result, both the jury selection process and our system of justice would suffer from the debilitating effects of regularly exercised discriminatory peremptory challenges, and the project begun in Batson -the elimination of discrimination from the selection of juries -would be endangered.
123. 476 U.S. at 92.
